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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LARRY L. HUTCHINGS,
200104*

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE
PeUtmritii appealed film," ilr Iim I i niiil's 'iijmiimi

P R O CEEDINGS

iismiss<H I Ins stvnml pelilmn lint'

post-conviction relief challenging revocation of probation for his convictions for two counts
of Sexual Abuse of a Child, second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Annotated §
* •**.-+

(Supp. 1990) I his Court granted'certiorari review' folio wing the t JtahCoi n I:
tTirmance of the dismissal by the district court. The court of appeals had

jurisdiction under § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (2001). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann.
§78-2-2(3)(l)(2001)and§78-2a-4(iy%>
ISSUES ON APPEAI , AND S I \ NDAR D* OF REVIEW
Issue I: When a petition for post-conviction relief is summarily dismissed, without
being served on the State or requesting an answer from the State, may this court determine

whether petitioner is entitled to post-conviction relief, or only whether the lower court erred
in summarily dismissing the petition?
Standard of Review: This question was not specifically addressed below, therefore
no standard of review applies.
Issue II: Did the Utah Court of Appeals correctly determine that the district court
properly summarily dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief?
Standard of Review: On a writ of certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the
court of appeals, not the district court, and applies the same standard of review used by the
court of appeals. Clark v. Clark, 2001 UT 44, f 8, 27 P.3d 538, 540.
When reviewing an appealfroman order granting or denying post-conviction relief,
the appellate court reviews the lower court's conclusions of law for correctness and its
findings of fact for clear error. Julian v. State, 2002 UT 61, f 8, 52 P.3d 1168, 1170. See
also Wickham v. Galetka, 2002 WL 1728629,2002 UT

, J 7,

P.3d

; Rudolph v.

Galetka, 2002 UT 7, f 4,43 P.3d 467,468; Matthews v. Galetka, 958 P.2d 949, 950 (Utah
App. 1998).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules relate to this appeal:
Addendum A - Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65C
Addendum B-Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Ann. §78-35a-101 through
§ 78.35a.110 (1996)

2

S' I \TEMENT OF THE CASE
On December 16, 1991, petitioner was charged with one count of Aggravated Sexual
Abuse of a Child, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404,, 1 (1 )(Supp. 1990), a first-degree

1990), second degree felonies (R. 07-08).
On July 7, 1992, petitioner pled guilty to two counts of Sexual Abuse of a Child (R.
10- 15, 18- 31) Petitioner was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than one nor
nun i I I ni ni mini I ni I tr rn , car mi hnlli ininili In iiiiiii concurrent!
imposition of the prison terms was stayed and petitioner was placed on probation for a period
of thirty-six months under certain conditions, including that he enter into and successfully
comp
Less than two years later, in April 1994, a motion for order to show cause why
probation should not be revoked was filed (R. 37). The district court entered a show cause
order, and the show cause hearing was scheduled for July 6, 199 ! I (R 1 2) Petitioner v, as
served with the order to show cause on June 1,1994 (R. 44). Petitioner did not appear at the
hearing on July 6th. However, petitioner was represented by counsel who advised the court
that petitioner had contacted him from New York and indicated that he could not afford
counsel (R 46)

Thv i MM I appointed count

represent petitioner"

rescheduled

the

hearing for September 7,1994
At the hearing on September 7, petitioner was again not present in person. However,
counsel tor pditmnn JMIVII1,! I itir"

i ml llliii.il In; hcllun ml pditiotia oulil pio\n1i' piool thut
3

he was back in therapy. He therefore requested a continuance (R. 48). The matter was
continued to September 26th. Id. At the hearing on September 26,1994, petitioner was again
not present, but was represented by counsel (R. 51). The court found that petitioner had not
completed counseling as required, and he was therefore in violation of his probation (R. 56).
The court ordered that probation would be revoked unless petitioner was enrolled in an
appropriate counseling program by October 11th, and provided evidence to his counsel that
he was enrolled (R. 56). If petitioner was not enrolled in counseling by October 11, 1994,
then he would have to come back to Utah and report to the Utah state prison (R. 54).1
In December of 1994, an affidavit in support of a motion for warrant of arrest was
filed, alleging that petitioner had violated the terms and conditions of his probation (R. 6566). An arrest warrant was signed on December 20 (R. 68). On February 8, 1995, a new
arrest warrant was signed (R. 70). Petitioner was eventually arrested on the Utah warrant
when he was arrested in New York for a DUI (R. 153,163).
Petitioner appeared before the Utah district court on July 16,1996 (R. 90). A public
defender was appointed to represent petitioner and the show cause hearing was scheduled
for August 20, 1996 (R. 90).

1

Petitioner asserts in his statement of facts that he "did enroll at the Share
Program and mailed, at Mr. Harrison's instruction, proof of that enrollment directly to the
Seventh District Court Clerk. Unfortunately, the court apparently never received it or
when it received the proof, did not know where to file or record the information." (Brief
of pet. at 7). Petitioner cites to no record support for this assertion. The state therefore
asks that the Court strike this unsupported assertion.
4

A

.

i: iclri litted tl lat he v iolated probation by

failing to successfully complete sex offender therapy as required (R. 93). Petitioner also
admitted that he violated probation by failing to report to his probation officer in the state of
New V ork since September of 1994 (R 95-96);" At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge
fbi ind that petitioner had violated the terms if his pi obation and ordered that he be sent tc ••
the Utah State Prison to serve the original sentence (R. 165, 168, 170-171).
Following the revocation hearing, petitioner filed a notice of appeal. (R 101 102)
"l in 1 )c trim lit "ni 0 I OOd llin i|i|iiiMl Mi.jr» IJIMTHS srd tor I inline lu filr I ilmm keting italniM nil I Ik
106). However, petitioner was advised that if the docketing statement was submitted within
ten days the appeal would be reinstated. Id. Apparently no docketing statement was ever
filed because the appeal was not reinstated. The Remittitur was issued on January 23, 199 7
(case # 960726-CA) (R. 104).3
Petitioner filed his first state petition for post-conviction relief on January 22, 1997
(R 123-132) On August 1, 1997, the district court entered an order which concluded that

# 970700008 (R. 193) (addendum D).

Petitioner had failed to report to his probation officer since September of 1994
The first show cause hearing in Utah concerning probation violations was held on
September 26,1994.
|
3

The notice of appeal appears to be untimely. The district court Order was filed
on August 22, 1996 (R. 171 and addendum C). The notice of appeal is dated October 18,
1996, but was not filed in Seventh District Court until November 4, 1996, and in the Utah
Court of \ppeals on November 12, 1996 (R. 101).
5

Petitioner appealed the dismissal of his first petition for post-conviction relief (R.
196). On January 23, 1998, the Utah Court of Appeals entered a memorandum decision
which affirmed the dismissal of the first post-conviction petition - case # 970479-CA (R.
226-227) (addendum E). A petition for rehearing was denied on March 23, 1998 (R. 250251)(addendum F). Petitioner apparently did not file any petition for writ of certiorari.
On November 11,1999, petitioner filed a petition for extraordinary relief directly in
the Utah Supreme Court (R. 316). On December 1,1999, pursuant to Rule 20(a) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, this Court ordered that the petition be "transferred to the
Seventh Judicial District Court for post-conviction proceedings under Rule 65(c) [sic] of the
Rules of Civil Procedure/' (R. 374) (addendum G).
Petitioner's second state petition for post-conviction relief was therefore filed in
Seventh District Court on December 7,1999 - case #990700187 (R. 374). The state was not
asked to file any answer or response to this second petition and was therefore not a party to
this action. See Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(g)(l) & (h). On October 20, 2000, the district court
entered a memorandum decision and order which summarily dismissed the second petition
(R. 433-435) (addendum H).
Petitioner timely filed a notice to appeal the district court's dismissal of his second
state petition for post-conviction relief. Since the State was not a party below, it was also not
a party to this appeal, and did not file any brief or appear in the appellate case. On March
22,2001, the court of appeals entered a memorandum decision which affirmed the dismissal

6

of the second petition - case # 20000994-CA (addendum I). On August 8, 2001, this Court
granted a petition for writ of certiorari - case # 20010419 (addendum J).
Although the state was not a party below, and did not respond at the district court or
appellate court level concerning dismissal of the second petition, in an order dated January
28, 2002, this Court requested that the State participate and file a brief in response
(addendum K). In addition, this Court appointed counsel to represent petitioner. Id.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The issue of whether petitioner is entitled to post-conviction relief is not before this
Court. The only issue before this Court is whether the court of appeals correctly affirmed
the district court's summary dismissal of petitioner's second petition for post-conviction
relief.
The district court properly denied and summarily dismissed petitioner's second
petition for post-conviction relief because the claims had already been raised or could have
been raised in his previous petition. The petition was also properly summarily dismissed
because it wasfrivolouson its face.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE ONLY ISSUE BEFORE THIS COURT IS WHETHER THE COURT OF
APPEALS CORRECTLY AFFIRMED THE DISTRICT COURT'S SUMMARY
DISMISSAL OF PETITIONER'S SECOND PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF.
In his brief, petitioner argues the merits of his underlying claims, as if this Court

should decide the merits of those issues. However, the merits of the underlying claims in the

7

second petition were not addressed by the district court because the petition was summarily
dismissed. That dismissal was affirmed by the court of appeals. On a writ of certiorari, this
Court reviews the decision of the court of appeals. Clark v Clark, 2001 UT 44, f 8,27 P.3d
538, 540. If this Court determines that the court of appeals decision was in error, it should
remand the case to the district court for appropriate proceedings under the Post-Conviction
Remedies Act and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See: Moench v. State,
2002 UT App 333 (trial court erred in finding petition frivolous - reversed and remanded,
directing trial court to order the Attorney General to file a response); Seel v. Van Der Veur,
971 P.2d 924 (Utah 1998) (remanded for further proceedings consistent with rule 65B).
Rule 65C provides that a petition shall be assigned to the judge who sentenced the
petitioner. Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(f). Thejudge must review the petition. Ifit is apparent that
the claim has already been adjudicated, or if the claim is frivolous, then the court "shall
forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim" Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(g)(l). In this case, the
district court judge summarily dismissed the petition (R. 433-43 5)(addendum H).
If the court concludes that a petition should not be summarily dismissed, the district
court must "designate the portions of the petition that are not dismissed and direct the clerk
to serve a copy of the petition, attachments and memorandum by mail upon the respondent.
If the petition is a challenge to a felony conviction or sentence, the respondent is the state of
Utah represented by the Attorney General." Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(h). The respondent has
thirty (30) days after service of the petition in which to file an answer or other response.
Utah R Civ P 65C(i).
8

In this case, because the petition was summarily dismissed, the State was not served
with the petition, and was not given an opportunity to answer or respond to the issue of
whether petitioner was entitled to post-conviction relief in his second petition.
If the case were remanded, the district court would enter its ruling only after allowing
the State to file an answer or other response, and after holding evidentiary hearings and/or
oral arguments, if necessary. Once a ruling was entered, the petitioner would have an
opportunity to appeal the district court decision. If the district court decided the issues on
the merits, then the court of appeals would review the district court's rulings on the merits.
Since there was no ruling on the merits, and the State was not given the opportunity
to respond at the district court or appellate court level, the issue of whether petitioner's
claims would justify post-conviction relief is not before this Court.
If this Court determines that the court of appeals erroneously affirmed the summary
dismissal of the second petition, the case should be remanded to the district court, and the
State should be given the opportunity to respond to the petition at the district court level, as
required by Rule 65C.
II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY AFFIRMED THE DISTRICT
COURT'S SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF PETITIONER'S SECOND PETITION
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF.
A.

The district court properiy summarily dismissed the second
petition because the issues were previously raised and addressed,
or could have been raised, in the first petition for post-conviction
relief.

The Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA) governs this petition. This Court recently

9

held that %4[t]he PCRA replaced prior post-conviction remedies with a statutory, 'substantive
legal remedy for any person who challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense
and who has exhausted all other legal remedies.' Id. § 78-35a-102." Julian v. State, 2002 UT
61, f 4,52 P.3d 1168.
Under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, a petitioner is not eligible for postconviction relief if the claims asserted in a second petition were "raised or addressed in any
previous request for post-conviction relief or could have been, but [were] not, raised in a
previous request forpost-conviction relief." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 5a-106(1)(d) (addendum
B).4

4

Prior to the PCRA, court rules and case law governed post-conviction remedies.
The pre-Act law permitted merits review of a claimfirstraised in a successive petition
only if a petitioner could establish ugood cause" for omitting itfromprior petitions. This
Court recognized that "raising issues in a subsequent habeas corpus petition that were not
but could have been raised in a previous habeas petition constitutes an abuse of the writ
and requires dismissal of the petition except where good cause is shown." Monson v.
State, 953 P.2d 73, 75 (Utah 1998). This Court also declared that all claims seeking postconviction relief should be raised in a single petition. See Andrews v. Shulsen, 113 P.2d
832, 833-34 (Utah 1988) (raising issues in a petition that were not but could have been
raised in a previous petition, except where good cause is show, constitutes an abuse of the
writ and requires dismissal of the petition). Accord, Hurst v. Cook, 111 P.2d 1029, 1037
(Utah 1989). See also; Gardner v. Holden, 888 P.2d 608,613 (Utah 1994); Wright v.
Carver, 886 P.2d 58, 60-61 (Utah 1994).
In Hurst, the court identified examples of the requisite "good cause:" 1) denial of a
constitutional right under retroactive new law; 2) previously unknown facts that might
change the trial's outcome; 3) fundamental unfairness in the conviction; 4) imposition of
an illegal sentence; and 5) "a claim overlooked in good faith with no intent to delay."
//wrs/,777P.2datl037.
By its clear language, the PCRA necessarily incorporates thefirstHurst exception:
a claim based on new, retroactive law could not have been raised in a prior petition. The
PCRA also contemplates the second exception to the extent that it allows relief for
evidence that meets the statutory definition of "newly discovered evidence." Utah Code

10

This was petitioner's second state petition for post-conviction relief In his brief,
petitioner ignores the fact that this was his second petition. But this fact is crucial as to why
summary dismissal was appropriate. All of the issues petitioner attempted to raise in his
second petition had previously been raised, (or could have been raised), in his prior petition
for post-conviction relief. The district court found that the claims petitioner attempted to
raise in his second petition had previously been "dealt with by the Appellate Court as well
as the Trial Court" (R. 434) (addendum H). It therefore properly summarily dismissed the
petition.
Upon review of the district court's dismissal of the second petition, the court of
appeals held that:
The Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-35a-101 to
-110 (1996), is dispositive. Section 78-35a-106(1) precludes relief on any
ground that was "raised or addressed ... on appeal" or "could have been but
was not raised on appeal" or "was raised or addressed in any previous request
for post-conviction relief or could have been, but was not raised in a previous
request for post-conviction relief."
Hutchings v. State, 2001 UT App 95 (unpublished) (addendum I),
The court of appeals then specifically held that the claims petitioner "raised in his
second petition were either raised and addressed, or could have been raised, in either the
direct appealfromthe probation revocation, thefirstpetition for post-conviction relief, or the

Ann, § 78-35a- 104(e). However, the clear language of the PCRA prohibits excusing a
procedural default on any of the remaining Hurst exceptions. (Of course, Utah law
provides an alternative remedy for correcting an illegal sentence. Utah R. Crim. P.
22(e)).

U

appeal from dismissal of that petition." Id. The court of appeals found that given the
preclusive effect of section 78-3 5a-106, the petitioner "may not continue to obtain review of
claims that were either raised or could have been raised on direct appeal or in previous postconviction proceedings and the appeal therefrom."5 Id.
Under the statutory guidelines of the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, the district court
properly summarily dismissed petitioner's second petition for post-conviction relief. The
court of appeals properly affirmed that dismissal. Therefore, this Court should affirm the
decision by the court of appeals.
B.

The district court also properly dismissed the petition because it
was frivolous.

Summary dismissal of the second petition was appropriate because the issues raised
had previously been raised, or could have been raised in the prior petition. This alone was
a sufficient and proper basis for summary dismissal. However, in addition, the district court
also found that the petition was frivolous.
Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that when a petition for postconviction relief isfiled,"[t]he assigned judge shall review the petition, and, if it is apparent

5

The court of appeals included the fact that the claims raised in the second
petition could have been raised in the direct appeal from the probation revocation. The
PCRA provides that a person is not eligible for post-conviction relief upon any ground
that "was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal" or that "could have been but was not
raised at trial or on appeal" Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(l). However, whether the
issues could have been raised in a direct appeal is an irrelevant inquiry when a second
petition is filed. The inquiry as to what could have been raised in a direct appeal is only
relevant as to the first state petition for post-conviction relief.
12

to the court that any claim has been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if any claim in the
petition appearsfrivolouson its face, the court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing the
claim, stating either that the claim has been adjudicated or that the claim is frivolous on its
face

The order of dismissal need not recite findings of fact or conclusions of law." Utah

R. Civ. P. 65C(g)(l) (addendum A).
The rule defines afrivolouspetition as follows:
(2)
A petition is frivolous on its face when, based solely on the
allegations contained in the pleadings and attachments, it appears that:
(A) the facts alleged do not support a claim for relief as a matter of
law;
(B)

the claims have no arguable basis in fact

Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(g)(2) (addendum A).
In his second petition, the petitioner alleged numerous claims, many of which raised
procedural issues concerning prior revocation hearings. However, the record establishes the
clear fact that petitioner eventually appeared in person at a revocation hearing where he
admitted on the record in open court that he had violated the terms of his probation (R. 9396). The facts alleged by the petitioner in his second petition were either cured by
subsequent events, were immaterial, or were not supported by the record. Pursuant to Rule
65C, the district court properly summarily dismissed petitioner's second petition because it
was frivolous.
In his second petition for post-conviction relief, petitioner alleged that:
1.

the "trial court's issuance of an order for the automatic revocation of the petitioners
probation was in error as the petitioner had never waived his right to be present...
13

Nor did he through his Attorney admit any allegations" (R. 326);
"the order issued by the trial court for the Automatic Revocation of Probation is in
standing effect as it has never been Vacated or Ordered set Aside" (R. 326);
"the city court for Ithaca New York . . Exonerated the Petitioner of the charge of
Violation of Probation by Disposing of the Charges and convicting on the charge of
unlicensed operation 3rd in Satisfaction of all Charges" (R. 327-28);
"The delayfromthe 15th day of May 1995 to the revocation hearing held on the 20th
day of August 1996 . . . does prejudice the petitioner" (R. 330);
"the Emory County Attorney raised allegations not mentioned in the Order to Show
Cause... Specifically the allegation that alleged the petitioner failed to report to his
Probation Officer during the time of 'Fictional Supervision"' (R. 33 l)(emphasis in
original);
"counsel was and is ineffective because he was not the counsel appointed by the trial
court at the hearing held the 6th day of July 1994" (R. 331);
"the court has inappropriately and illegally imposed a sentence of five (5) years to life
and done so 'behind closed doors' by its order to show cause and to commit to the
Utah state prison" (R. 332)(emphasis in original);
"The trial court erred in its order on the petitioners petition for post-conviction relief
in that the court failed to appoint counsel and set the matter for an evidentiary
hearing" (R. 334).

14

In its memorandum decision dismissing the second petition, the district court noted
that it had reviewed the petition, the entry of the plea, and the admissions of probation
violations (addendum H). The Court found that the petitioner was present in person at the
revocation hearing. The petitioner was represented by counsel David Allred, who was a legal
defender for Emery County, and who was appointed to represent the petitioner in the Show
Cause proceedings. The court also specifically noted that the probation violation hearing was
held in open court (R. 433) (addendum H).
At the hearing, the petitioner admitted violating the terms of his probation. The
district court specifically found that "[t]here is no question that the petitioner had, in fact,
violated the terms of his probation, had failed to report, and had not successfully completed
the sexual abuse counseling" (R. 433). Therefore, petitioner's probation was revoked and
he was sentenced to the Utah State Prison under the terms of the original judgment (R. 43334) (addendum H).
Based on the district court findings, it is clear that the issues raised by petitioner were
frivolous. For example, petitioner alleged that he never waived his right to be present at the
revocation hearing and did not, through his attorney, admit any allegations. Although
petitioner was not present for earlier proceedings, the district court specifically found that the
petitioner was present in person at the revocation hearing, where he admitted violating
probation. Another example is that petitioner alleged that the hearing occurred "behind
closed doors." The district court specifically found that the hearing was held in open court.

15

Based on its knowledge of the case, and its review of the petition, entry of the plea,
and the probation revocation hearing, the district court properly summarily dismissed the
second petition because it was frivolous. The facts alleged in the petition either did not
support a claim for post-conviction relief as a matter of law, or the claims had no arguable
basis in fact.
C.

The district court properly dismissed the second petition without
holding a hearing or appointing counsel.

Petitioner alleges that the district court erred in dismissing the petition without a
hearing and without appointing counsel. In his brief, petitioner asserts that "the trial court
found on the record that Mr. Hutchings' post-conviction petition merited both the
appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing." (Brief of pet. at 14). However,
petitioner is apparently referring to statements made by the court at a hearing concerning the
first petition for post-conviction relief (case # 970700008), held on January 22, 1997. (R.
143-144). The district court did not hold that petitioner's second petition for post-conviction
relief (case # 990700187) merited appointment of counsel or an evidentiary hearing.6
The post-conviction rules clearly provide for summary dismissal of a petition. Utah
R. Civ. P. 65C(g) (addendum A). Obviously no hearing is required when a petition is
summarily dismissed. Even if a petition is not summarily dismissed, a hearing is not always

6

Even if a court originally thought a petitioner was entitled to a hearing and to
appointment of counsel, after a review of the law and the facts of a particular case, a court
could appropriately simply change its mind and rule that a hearing and appointment of
counsel were not necessary.
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required. The rule provides that: "[ajfter pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set
the proceeding for a hearing or otherwise dispose of the case" Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(j)
(emphasis added) (addendum A). In appropriate cases, a district court may properly dispose
of a post-conviction petition without ever holding any hearing. The district court in this case
did not err by summarily dismissing the petition without holding any hearing, because no
hearing was required.
Petitioner was also not entitled to appointment of counsel. A petitioner has no
constitutional right to counsel in a civil petition for post-conviction relief. See e.g. Ross v.
Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600,94 S.Ct. 2437 (1974); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551,107 S.Ct.
1990 (1987); Anderson v. Cowan, 227 F.3d 893,901 (7th Cir. 2000). However, if a petition
is not summarily dismissed, the district court may decide to appoint pro bono counsel in
certain cases. Since the petition was summarily dismissed in this case, the district court
properly did not appoint counsel.
Even if the petition had not been summarily dismissed, the district court would not
have been required to appoint pro bono counsel. The Post-Conviction Remedies Act
provides that:
(1)

If any portion of the petition is not summarily dismissed, the court may,
upon the request of an indigent petitioner, appoint counsel on a pro
bono basis.
* * *

(2)

In determining whether to appoint counsel, the court shall consider the
following factors:
(a)
whether the petition contains factual allegations that will require
an evidentiary hearing; and
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(b)

whether the petition involves complicated issues of law or fact
that require the assistance of counsel for proper adjudication.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-109 (emphasis added) (addendum B). The district court did not
err in not appointing pro bono counsel, because the petition was properly summarily
dismissed.
CONCLUSION
The district court properly summarily dismissed petitioner's second petition for postconviction relief because the issues raised were previously raised, or could have been raised,
in the first petition for post-conviction relief. The petition was also properly dismissed
because it was frivolous. The court of appeals properly affirmed the summary dismissal of
the second petition. This Court should affirm the court of appeals decision.
If this Court should find that the court of appeals decision was in error, and that
summary dismissal of the second petition was improper, the remedy is to remand the matter
back to the district court for appropriate proceedings under the Post-Conviction Remedies
Act and Rule 65C, including providing the State with the opportunity to answer or respond
to the petition at the district court level.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / £ cfcv of October, 2002.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
ATTORNEY GENERAL

C/£c&^-<

A4.X-

ERIN RILEY
Assistant Attorney Genera
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

When is a person in custody of governmental
authorities for purpose of exercise of state remedy of habeas corpus—modern cases, 26
AAJL4th 455.
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Allowance of attorneys' fees in mandamus
proceedings, 34 ALR.4th 457.

Rule 65C. Post-conviction relief.
(a) Scope. This rule shall govern proceedings in all petitions for postconviction relief filed under Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-101 et seq., PostConviction Remedies Act
(b) Commencement and venue. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing
a petition with the clerk of the district court in the county in which the
judgment of conviction was entered. The petition should be filed on forms
provided by the court- The court may order a change of venue on its own motion
if the petition is filed in the wrong county. The court may order a change of
venue on motion of a party for the convenience of the parties or witnesses.
(c) Contents of the petition. The petition shall set forth all claims that the
petitioner has in relation to the legality of the conviction or sentence.
Additional claims relating to the legality of the conviction or sentence may not
be raised in subsequent proceedings except for good cause shown. The petition
shall state:
(1) whether the petitioner is incarcerated and, if so, the place of incarceration;
(2) the name of the court in which the petitioner was convicted and
sentenced and the dates of proceedings in which the conviction was entered,
together with the court's case number for those proceedings, if known by the
petitioner,
(3) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts that form the basis of the
petitioner's claim to relief;
(4) whether the judgment of conviction, the sentence, or the commitment for
violation of probation has been reviewed on appeal, and, if so, the number and
title of the appellate proceeding, the issues raised on appeal, and the results of
the appeal;
(5) whether the legality of the conviction or sentence has been adjudicated
in any prior post-conviction or other civil proceeding, and, if so, the case
number and title of those proceedings, the issues raised in the petition, and the
results of the prior proceeding; and
(6) if the petitioner claims entitlement to relief due to newly discovered
evidence, the reasons why the evidence could not have been discovered in time
for the claim to be addressed in the trial, the appeal, or any previous
post-conviction petition.
(d) Attachments to the petition. If available to the petitioner, the petitioner
shall attach to the petition:
(1) affidavits, copies of records and other evidence in support of the allegations;
(2) a copy of or a citation to any opinion issued by an appellate court
regarding the direct appeal of the petitioner's case;
(3) a copy of the pleadingsfiledby the petitioner in any prior post-conviction
or other civil proceeding that abjudicated the legality of the conviction or
sentence; and
(4) a copy of all relevant orders and memoranda of the court.
(e) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument
or citations or discuss authorities in the petition, but these may be set out in
a separate memorandum, two copies of which shall befiledwith the petition.
(0 Assignment On thefilingof the petition, the clerk shall promptly assign
and deliver it to the judge who sentenced the petitioner. If the judge who
sentenced the petitioner is not available, the clerk shall assign the case in the
normal course.
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(g)(1) Summary dismissal of claims. The assigned judge s hall review the
petition, and, if it is apparent to the court that any claim has been adjudicated
in a prior proceeding, or if any claim in the petition appearsfrivolouson its
face, the court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating
either that the claim has been adjudicated or that the claim isfrivolouson its
face. The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim
shall terminate with the entry of the order of dismissal. The order of dismissal
need not recitefindingsof fact or conclusions of law.
(2) A petition isfrivolouson its face when, based solely on the allegations
contained in the pleadings and attachments, it appears that:
(A) the facts alleged do not support a claim for relief as a matter of law;
(B) the claims have no arguable basis in fact; or
(C) the petition challenges the sentence only and the sentence has expired
prior to thefilingof the petition.
(3) If a petition is notfrivolouson its face but is deficient due to a pleading
error or failure to comply with the requirements of this rule, the court shall
return a copy of the petition with leave to amend within 20 days. The court
may grant one additional 20 day period to amend for good cause shown.
(4) The court shall not review for summary dismissal the initial poetconviction petition in a case where the petitioner is sentenced to death.
(h) Service ofpetitions. If, on review of the petition, the court concludes that
all or part of the petition should not be summarily dismissed, the court shall
designate the portions of the petition that are not dismissed and direct the
clerk to serve a copy of the petition, attachments and memorandum by mail
upon the respondent. If the petition is a challenge tp a felony conviction or
sentence, the respondent is the state of Utah represented by the Attorney
General. In all other cases, the respondent is the governmental entity that
prosecuted the petitioner.
(i) Answer or other response. Within 30 days (plus time allowed under these
rules for service by mail) after service of a copy of the petition upon the
respondent, or within such other period of time as the court may allow, the
respondent shall answer or otherwise respond to the portions of the petition
that have not been dismissed and shall serve the answer or other response
upon the petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b). Within 30 days (plus time
allowed for service by mail) after service of any motion to dismiss or for
summary judgment, the petitioner may respond by memorandum to the
motion. No further pleadings or amendments will be permitted unless ordered
by the court.
(j) Hearings. After pleadings are dosed, the court shall promptly set the
proceeding for a hearing or otherwise dispose of the case. The court may also
order a prehearing conference, but the conference shall not be set so as to delay
unreasonably the hearing on the merits of the petition. At the prehearing
conference, the court may:
(1) consider the formation and simplification of issues;
(2) require the parties to identify witnesses and documents; and
(3) require the parties to establish the admissibility of evidence expected to
be presented at the evidentiary hearing.
(k) Presence of the petitioner at hearings. The petitioner shall be present at
the prehearing conference if the petitioner is not represented by counsel. The
prehearing conference may be conducted by means of telephone or video
conferencing. The petitioner shall be present before the court at hearings on
dispositive issues but need not otherwise be present in court during the
proceeding. The court may conduct any hearing at the correctional facility
where the petitioner is confined.
(1) Discovery; records. Discovery under Rules 26 through 37 shall be allowed
by the court upon motion of a party and a determination that there is good
cause to believe that discovery is necessary to provide a party with evidence
that is likely to be admissible at an evidentiary hearing. The court may order
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either the petitioner or the respondent to obtain any relevant transcript or
court records,
(m) Orders; stay.
(1) If the court vacates the original conviction or sentence, it shall enter
findings of fact and conclusions of law and an appropriate order. If the
petitioner is serving a sentence for a felony conviction, the order shall be
stayed for 5 days. Within the stay period, the respondent shall give written
notice to the court and the petitioner that the respondent will pursue a new
trial, pursue a new sentence, appeal the order, or take no action. Thereafter the
stay of the order is governed by these rules and by the Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
(2) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice that no action will
be taken, the stay shall expire and the court shall deliver forthwith to the
custodian of the petitioner the order to release the petitioner.
(3) If the respondent gives notice that the petitioner will be retried or
resentenced, the trial court may enter any supplementary orders as to
arraignment, trial, sentencing, custody, bail, discharge, or other matters that
may be necessary and proper.
(n) Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as allowed under
Rule 54(d), to any party as it deems appropriate. If the petitioner is indigent,
the court may direct the costs to be paid by the governmental entity that
prosecuted the petitioner. If the petitioner is in the custody of the Department
of Corrections, Section 64-13-23 and sections 21-7-3 through 21-7-4.7 govern
the manner and procedure by which the trial court shall determine the
amount, if any, to charge for fees and costs.
(o) Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition may be
appealed to and reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court of
Utah in accord with the statutes governing appeals to those courts.
(Added effective July 1, 1996.)
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule
replaces former paragraph (b) of Rule 65B. It
governs proceedings challenging a conviction or
sentence, regardless whether the claim relates
to an original commitment, a commitment for
violation of probation, or a sentence other than
commitment Claims relating to the terms or
conditions of confinement are governed by
paragraph (b) of the Rule 65B. This rule, as a
general matter, simplifies the pleading requirements and contains two significant changes
from procedure under the former rule. First,
the paragraph requires the clerk of court to
assign post-conviction relief to the judge who
sentenced the petitioner if that judge is available. Second, the rule allows the court to dis-

miss frivolous claims before any answer or
other response is required. This provision is
patterned after the federal practice pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254. The advisory committee
adopted the summary procedures set forth as a
means of balancing the requirements of fairness and due process on the one hand against
the public's interest in the efficient adjudication
of the enormous volume of post-conviction relief
cases.
The requirement in paragraph (1) for a determination that discovery is necessary to discover
relevant evidence that is likely to be admissible
at an evidentiary hearing is a higher standard
than is normally used in determining motions
for discovery.

Addendum B

POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES ACT
Section
78-35a-106.
78-35a-107.

Preclusion of relief - Exception,
Statute of limitation* for postconviction relief.

Section
78-35*-108.
78-35a-109.
78-35a-110.

78-35a-104

Effect of granting relief - Notics.
Appointment of counsel,
Appeal - Jurisdiction.

PARTI
GENERAL PROVISIONS
78-35*101* Short title.
This act shall be known as the "Post-Conviction Remedies Act."
History: C. 1963, 7846a-101, enacted by
L. 1986, ch* 288, f 1.
Compiler's Notes. - As enacted, this chapter did not contain a Part 2.

Effective Dates. - Lawe 1996, ch. 235
became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to
Utah Const, Art VI, Sec 25.

78-35a-102« Replacement of prior remedies
(1) This chapter establishes a substantive legal remedy for any person who
challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense and who has
exhausted all other legal remedies, including a direct appeal except as
provided in Subsection (2). Procedural provisions forfilingand commencement
of a petition are found in Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(2) This chapter doee not apply to:
(a) habeas corpus petitions that do not challenge a conviction or
sentence for a criminal offense;
(b) motions to correct a sentence pursuant to Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure; or
(c) actions taken by the Board of Pardons and Parole.
History? C 1868, 7M8e>188» saeeted by
L. 1686, ek. 3 3 M 8.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1996, ch. 236

78-35a-10&

became tractive on April 29,1996, pursuant to
Utah Const, Art VT. Sec 25.

Applicability - Effect o n petitions.

Except for the limitation period established in Section 78-35a-107, this
chapter applies only to poet-conviction proceedings filed on or after July 1,
1996.
rilsiiMji C 1868, 78-86e>106, sascitsH by
L» 1966, efc. 886, | S.
Rflbetfv* Dstee. - Laws 1996, ch. 236

became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to
Utah Const, Art VT, Sec 25.

78-35a-104. Ground* for relief - Retroactivity of rule.
(1) Unless precluded by Section 78-35a-106 or 78-35a-107, a person who has
been convicted and sentenced for a criminal offense may file an action in the
district court of original jurisdiction for post-conviction relief to vacate or
modify the conviction or sentence upon the following grounds:

(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed in violation
of the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution;
(b) the conviction was obtained under a statute that is in violation of the
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution, or the conduct for which
the petitioner was prosecuted is constitutionally protected;
(c) the sentence was imposed in an unlawful manner, or probation was
revoked in an unlawful manner,
(d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution; or
(e) newly discovered material evidence exists that requires the court to
vacate the conviction or sentence, because:
(i) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the
evidence at the time of trial or sentencing or in time to include the
evidence in any previously filed post-trial motion or post-conviction
proceeding, and the evidence could not have been discovered through
the exercise of reasonable diligence;
(ii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that
was known;
(iii) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence;
and
(iv) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered
material evidence demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact could
have found the petitioner guilty of the offense or subject to the
sentence received.
(2) The question of whether a petitioner is entitled to the benefit of a rule
announced by the United States Supreme Court, Utah Supreme Court, or
Utah Court of Appeals after the petitioner's conviction became final shall be
governed by applicable state and federal principles of retroactivity.
History: C. 1963, 7$-36a*104, enacted by
L. 199C ch. 235,1 4.
Eflbethr* Date* - Laws 1996, ch. 235

became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to
Utah Con*., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-35a-105, Burden of proof.
The petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving by a preponderance of
the evidence the facta necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief. The
respondent has the burden of pleading any ground of preclusion under Section
78-35a-106, but once a ground has been pled, the petitioner has the burden to
disprove its existence by a preponderance of the evidence.
History: C. 1963* 7S-35a-106, enacted by
L. 199C eh. 235, | 5.
Eflbethr* Date*. - Laws 1996, ch. 235

became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to
Utah Comt., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-35*106. Preclusion of relief - Exception.
( D A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground
that:
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion;
fb) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal;
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal;

i d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction
relief or could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for
post-conviction relief; or
< e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78-35a-107.
12) Notwithstanding Subsection (1XO, a person may be eligible for relief on
a basis that the ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on
appeal, if the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of
counsel.
History: C. 1963, 78-36*-106, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 236, « 6.
Effective Date*. - Laws 1996, ch. 236

became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-35a-107. Statute of limitations for post-conviction relief.
( D A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one year
after the cause of action has accrued.
(2) For purposes of this section, the cause of action accrues on the latest of
the following dates:
(a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment
of conviction, if no appeal is taken;
(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has jurisdiction
over the case, if an appeal is taken;
(c) the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Utah
Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court, if no petition for writ
of certiorari is filed;
(d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari or the
entry of the decision on the petition for certiorari review, if a petition for
writ of certiorari is filed; or
(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the
exercise of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition
is based.
(3) If the court finds that the interests of justice require, a court may excuse
a petitioner's failure to file within the time limitations.
(4) Sections 78-12-36 and 78-12-40 do not extend the limitations period
established in this section.
History: C. 1963, 78-U-S1.1, eoaeted by L.
1996, ch. 82, | U renumbered by L. 1996,
ch. 235, | 7.
Repeals and Realise fmsuts — Laws
1995, ch 82, i 1 repealsformer178-12-31.1, ss
enacted by Laws 1979, ch. 133, | 1, setting s
three-month tuns limit on the right to petition
for a habeas corpus writ, and enacts the present
section, effective May 1, 1996.
Amendment Notes. - The 1996 amendment, effective April 29,1996, renumbered this
section, which formerly appeared ss J 78-12*

31.1; added Subsection (4), redesignating
former Subsection (4) as (3); deleted former
Subeections (3) and (5) concerning applicability
to tune limitations and motions to correct a
sentence; in Subsections (1) and (2) deleted
"pursuant to Rule 65B(b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure" after "entitled to relief, and in
Subsection (2) deleted *in a petition for postconviction relief* after "cause of action."
Croee-Referencee. - Extraordinary relief.
Rule 65B, U.R.C.P.

78-35a-108. Effect of granting relief - Notice.
(1) If the court grants the petitioner's request for relief, it shall either
(a) modify the original conviction or sentence; or
(b) vacate the original conviction or sentence and order a new trial or
sentencing proceeding as appropriate.
(2) (a) If the petitioner is serving a felony sentence, the order shall be
stayed for five days. Within the stay period, the respondent shall give
written notice to the court and the petitioner that the respondent will
pursue a new trial or sentencing proceedings, appeal the order, or take no
action.
(b) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice at any time
during the stay period that it intends to take no action, the court shall lift
the stay and deliver the order to the custodian of the petitioner.
(c) If the respondent gives notice that it intends to retry or resentence
the petitioner, the trial court may order any supplementary orders as to
arraignment, trial, sentencing, custody, bail, discharge, or other matters
that may be necessary.
History: C. 1963, 7S-35*-106, enacted by
L. 1996, ch* 286,1 S.
Effective Dates. - LAWS 1996, ch. 235

became tfftctm on April 29,1996, pursuant to
Utah Const, Art VI, Sec 25.

78-35a-109. Appointment of counsel
(1) If any portion of the petition is not summarily dismissed, the court may,
upon the request of an indigent petitioner, appoint counsel on a pro bono basis.
Counsel who represented the petitioner at trial or on the direct appeal may not
be appointed to represent the petitioner under this section*
(2) In determining whether to appoint counsel, the court shall consider the
following factors:
(a) whether the petition contains factual allegations that will require
an evidentiary hearing; and
(b) whether the petition involves complicated issues of law or fact that
require the assistance of counsel for proper adjudication.
(3) An allegation that counsel appointed under this section was ineffective
cannot be the basis for relief in any subsequent post-conviction petition.

78-35a-110- Appeal — Jurisdiction.
Any party may appeal from the trial court's final judgment on a petition for
post-conviction relief to the appellate court having jurisdiction pursuant to
Section 78-2-2 or 78-2a-3.
History: C. 1968, 7S-S6a-110, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 3SS, | 10.
Efleetire Dales. - Law* 1996, ch. 236

bscams effective on April 29,1996, pursusnt to
Utah Co rut., Art VI, Sec. 25.

Addendum C

7th DIST. COURT - CASTLE DALE
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH vs. LARRY LEWIS HUTCHINGS
CASE NUMBER 911701048 State Felony
CHARGES
Charge 1 - 76-5-404.1 - SEX ABUSE CHILD
2nd Degree Felony Plea: July 07,1992 Guilty
Disposition: July 07,1992 {Guilty Plea}
Charge 2 - 76-5-404.1(2) - AGGRAVATED SEX ABUSE OF A CHILD
1 st Degree Felony Plea: July 07, 1992 Guilty
Disposition: July 07, 1992 {Guilty Plea}
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
BRUCE K. HALLJDAY
PARTIES
Defendant - LARRY LEWIS HUTCHINGS
READING, PA 19604
Plaintiff- STATE OF UTAH
Represented by: DAVID A BLACKWELL
Represented by: MARY L. MANLEY
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Defendant Name: LARRY LEWIS HUTCHINGS
Offense tracking number: 578911
Date of Birth: February 16,1965
Law Enforcement Agency: Emery Co Sheriff
Prosecuting Agency: EMERY COUNTY
Violation Date: March 01,1990 EMERY COUNTY
ACCOUNT SUMMARY
PROCEEDINGS
10-29-91 Information filed
10-29-91 Filed: AMENDED INFORMATION
10-29-91 Filed: BIND OVER ORDER

julieqw
julieqw

12-16-91 Filed: THIRD AMENDED INFORMATION
julieqw
08-28-92 Filed judgment: JUDGMENT - SIGNED BY JUDGE BOYD BUNNELL
julieqw
Judge bhallida
Signed July 07, 1992
08-22-96 Filed order: ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND COMMITMENT TO
UTAH STATE PRISON
julieqw
Judge bhallida
Printed: 10/08/02 13:07:30
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Signed August 21,1996
11 -04-96 Filed: NOTICE OF APPEAL
julieqw
11 -04-96 Filed: AFFIDAVIT OF IMPECUNIOSITY
julieqw
11-21 -96 Filed: COPY OF LETTER FROM COURT OF APPEALS
julieqw
11 -26-96 Filed: MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
julieqw
12-04-96 Filed: COPY OF MOTION WITH JUDGE'S NOTE AT BOTTOM
julieqw
12-04-96 Filed: NOTICE OF HEARING
julieqw
12-12-96 Filed: REQUEST FOR COPIES
julieqw
12-12-96 Filed order: ORDER TO PRODUCE
julieqw
Judge bhallida
Signed December 04,1996
12-12-96 Filed: ORDER OF DISMISSAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
julieqw
01-22-97 Minute Entry-Motion
julieqw
Judge: BRUCE K. HALLIDAY
PRESENT
Clerk: JULIE WINN
Defendant
Tape Number:

0334 Tape Count: 3301

HEARING
TAPE: 0334 COUNT: 3301
Motion for Court Appointed Counsel. The Court informed the
defendant that because of the allegations in the Petition, it
prevented the Courtfromappointed the public defender, David
Allred. The State addressed the Court regarding the responsibility
of
the County to pay for counsel for the defendant on post conviction
motions. The Court will allow the State 15 days to respond to the
petition of the defendant and time for setting an evidentiary
hearing.

01-22-97 Minute Entry - Motion
Judge: BRUCE K. HALLIDAY
PRESENT
Clerk: JULIE WINN
Prosecutor: MARY L. MANLEY
Defendant
Tape Number:

julieqw

0334 Tape Count: 3301

HEARING
TIME: 9:05 a Counsel for the State addressed the Court in
regards to the County's responsibility to provide the defendant
with counsel for post-conviction matters.
TIME: 9:10 a The Court will allow that State 15 days to respond
to the Petition regarding counsel and time for setting an
Printed: 10/08/02 13:07:35
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evidentiary hearing.
TIME: 9:00 a The defendant presented the Court with a Petition
for Post Conviction Relief. The Court accepted and reviewed said
petition.
01-22-97 Minute Entry - Motion
julieqw
Judge: BRUCE K. HALLIDAY
PRESENT
Clerk: JULIE WINN
Prosecutor: MARY L. MANLEY
Defendant
Audio
Tape Number:

0334 Tape Count: 3301

HEARING
The defendant presented the Court with a Petition for Post
Conviction Relief. The Court accepted the Petition and reviewed
the same.
Because of the allegations in the Petition, the Court is unable to
appointed the public defender. The State addressed the Court in
regards to the County's responsible to provide counsel on
post-conviction motions.
The Court will allow the State 15 days to respond to the Petition

regarding counsel and time for setting an evidentiary hearing.
01-24-97 Filed: remittitur from court of appeals - order of dismissal julieqw
02-21-97 Filed: Motion to Set for Hearing on Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief
wendid
01-26-98 Filed: Memorandum Decision - Utah Court of Appeals
wendid
08-07-98 Filed: Remittur
julieqw
10-27-98 Filed: Motion of Discovery
wendid
05-19-99 Filed: Transcript of Hearing 7-7-92
wendid
05-19-99 Filed: Transcript of Hearing 9-26-94
wendid
05-19-99 Filed: Transcript of Hearing 8-20-96
wendid
wendid
05-19-99 Filed: Transcript of Hearing 1-22-97
julieqw
05-09-01 Filed order: Amended Judgment
Judge bhallida
Signed May 07, 2001
05-09-01 Filed order: Order on Order to Show Cause
julieqw
Judge bhallida
Signed May 07, 2001
julieqw
05-16-01 Filed: Letter from Supreme Court
Printed: 10/08/02 13:07:37
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH

LARRY L. HUTCHINGS,

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S
PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF

:

Plaintiff,
vs.

THE STATE OF UTAH,
:

Defendant:.

Civil No. 970700008

The Court, having reviewed Petitioner Larry L. K
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in the above-entitle
and having reviewed the proceedings wherein the Plaintiff w
m

violation of his probation, now concludes as follows.
1.

Petitioner's claim that his probation revcca'

in an unlawful manner is not justified by the proceedings
The claims appear to be specious and frivolous upon thei.
Any claim of inappropriateness of timeliness of the filing
service of same need be made at the time of appearance s
subsequently at this late date.
2.

The

claim

of

Petitioner

of

meffectivene

counsel is not substantiated bv anv factual allegations but
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the Petitioner's conclusions that the Petitioner was unable to
communicate with his attorney and a claimed error on the part of
tne attorney in not reviewing the case history, again, a conclusion
not substantiated by any factual allegations made by the Petitioner
herein.
Based

thereon, the Court concludes that the Petition is

SDecicus and frivolous and herebv denies same.
Due to the foregoing decision, the Court concludes that
Plaintiff's Motion to Grant Relief filed herein on May 27th as well
as his Motion for Order to Show Cause filed herein on July 2nd are
frivolous and are nereby denied,
DATED this «=*/ day of

, 1997

3*UCE K. HALLxDAY\
District Court Judae
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the r
true and correct

copy of the

day of fWtiSr

1997, a

foregoing ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S

PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF was mailed, postage prepaid, to
the following:
Larry L. Hutchings
c/o Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020
Mary L. Manley
Deputy Emery County Attorney
P.O. Box 249
Castle Dale, Utah 84513
Angela Micklos
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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Addendum E

riLCU
JAN 2 3 1998
OOURT OF APPEALS
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
OOOoo
Larry L. Hutchings,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Petitioner and Appellant,
v.

Case No. 970479-CA

State of Utah,
F I L E D
Respondent and Appellee.

(January 23, 1998)

Seventh District, Castle Dale Department
The Honorable Bruce K. Halliday
Attorneys:

Larry L. Hutchings, Draper, Appellant Pro Se

Before Judges Greenwood, Jackson, and Orme.
PER CURIAM;
Hutchings appeals the trial courtfs dismissal of his
petition for post-conviction relief- We affirm.
In an earlier appeal, Case No. 960726-CA, Hutchings
contested the trial court's order revoking his probation and
claimed that his counsel was ineffective. That appeal was
dismissed after Hutchings failed to file a docketing statement.
In the subject petition, Hutchings attempts to contest the same
issues--the probation revocation and the effectiveness of his
counsel.
Even if we pass over the procedural difficulty presented by
the dismissal of the prior appeal and reach the merits of
Hutchinge'a arguments, they would fail. It is undisputed that on
June 2, 1994, the State filed a motion for order to show cause
and an affidavit in support alleging probation violations by
Hutchings and that on December 16, 1994, the State filed a motion
for warrant of arrest and an affidavit in support. Hutchings
and/or his attorney were/was given copies of these documents and
of the court's resulting orders and thereby received written
notice of the nature of the allegations against Hutchings and of
the pendency of enforcement actions in the trial court requiring
him to respond, Hutchings and/or his attorney appeared at all of
the hearings concerning his probation violations/ further

evidence that they/he received proper notice. At the September
1994 hearing, Hutchings's attorney conceded that Hutchings had
violated his probation when he requested additional time for
Hutchings to enroll in counseling, a condition of his probation,
and at the August 1995 hearing, Hutchings admitted to two
probation violations which led to the second order revoking his
probation. Moreover, the filing of the affidavits by the State
alleging probation violations, the trial court's Issuance of
orders to show cause and a warrant tolled Hutchings's probation
period and, thus, it did not expire on July 7, 1995, as Hutchings
argues. Saa Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(9) (b) (1992),
We agree with the trial court that Hutchings's claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel is not supported by any
evidence. Hutchings makes broad assertions about his counsel's
actions, but fails to offer specific factual support for his
claim or to meet the requirements of Strickland v. Washington.
46S U.S. S68, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed 2d 674 (1984).
Accordingly, the trial court's order dismissing Hutchings's
petition for po3t-conviction relief is affirmed.

370479-CA

2

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 23rd day of January, 1998, a true and
correct copy of the attached MEMORANDUM DECISION was deposited in the
United States mail to:
Larry L. Hutchings
#25435
PO Box 250
Draper UT 84020
and a true and correct copy of the attached MEMORANDUM DECISION was
deposited in the United States mail to the judge listed below:
Honorable Bruce K. Kalliday
Seventh District Court
PO Box 907
Castle Dale UT 84513

TRIAL COURT: Seventh District, Castle Dale Dept., #970700008
APPEALS CASE NO.: 970479-CA
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Addendum P

FILED
MAR 23 1998
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Clerk of the Court
00O00

Larry L. Hutchings,
Plaintiff and Appellant

ORDER DENYING PETITION
FOR REHEARING

v.
Case No. 970479-CA
State of Utah,
Defendant and Appellee.

Before Judges Greenwood, Jackson, and Orme.
This matter is before the court on Hutchingsfs petition for
rehearing by which he argues that in our January 23, 1998,
memorandum decision we improperly relied upon the dismissal of
his earlier appeal and improperly concluded that his probation
did not automatically expire on July 7, 1995. We reject these
arguments.
Although we mentioned the fact that Hutchingsfs earlier
appeal, Case No. 96Q726-CA, was dismissed for failure to file a
docketing statement and not on the merits, we did not rely upon
this dismissal as dispositive of his claims in the subject
appeal.
Hutchingsfs appeal involved the interpretation of the 1992
version of Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(9)(b). According to £he 1992
version of the statute, the filing of affidavits by the State
alleging probation violations, the trial court's issuance of
orders to show cause and a warrant before July 7, 1995, tolled
his probation period. The cases upon which Hutchings's relies
for his argument that his probation automatically expired on July
7, 1995, interpret earlier and different versions of that statute
and are therefore not controlling in his case. State v. Moya,
815 P.2d 1312 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) and State v. Green. 757 P.2d
462, 464 (Utah 1988) interpret the 1984 version of the statute
which did not contain the subject tolling provision. In both
Moya and Green, the State did not file its first affidavit in
support of order to show cause until after the original probation
period had expired. Smith v. Cook. 803, P. 2d 788 (Utah 1990)
interprets the 1981 version of the statute which did not contain
the subject tolling provision. In Cook, the Utah Supreme Court
concluded that "because Cook was not given notice of the
revocati ^n proceedings prior to the expiration of his probation,"
the tria court lacked the authority to revoke his probation
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after it automatically expired pursuant to the subject statute.
803 P.2d at 793. In the subject case, the affidavit, order to
show cause, and warrant were filed before Hutchings's original
probation period expired. We also considered and rejected
Hutchings's claim concerning notice. At the first order to show
cause hearing in July 1994, Hutchings•s counsel stated that he
was appearing at Hutchings1s request. Counsel and/or Hutchings
appeared at all subsequent hearings, evidence that the State gave
appropriate notice.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition is
denied as Hutchings has failed to present any points of law or
fact which were overlooked or misapprehended in our January 23,
1998, memorandum decision.
Dated t hi s^%! J day of March, 1998.
FOR THE COURT:
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on March 23, 1998, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail to
the parties listed below:
Larry L. Hutchings
#25435
PO Box 250
Draper UT 84020
Dated this March 23, 1998.

By

JSLUIOLJM
Deputy Clerk

Case No. 970479-CA

252

Addendum G

r DEC
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

FILED

7 (999
.

fc
"C,

— OOOOO —

Larry L. Hutchings,
Plaintiff and Petitioner,
v.

Case No. 991006-SC

State of Utah,
Defendant and Respondent.

(\^\O^OC?

'

Order
This matter is before the court upon a petition for
extraordinary writ filed on November 10, 1999. A response to the
petition was filed by the State of Utah on November 17, 1999.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED pursuant to Rule 20(a) of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure the petition and supporting motions are
transferred to the Seventh Judicial District Court for postconviction proceedings under Rule 65(c) of Rules of Civil
Procedure.

For The Court:

/2esmJa.A
Dated

#9?
Pat H. Bartholomew
Clerk of the Court
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on December 2,1999, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER
was deposited in the United States mail to the party(ies) listed below:
LARRY L. HUTCHINGS
#25435
PO BOX 250
DRAPER UT 84020
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was hand delivered to a personal
representative of the following office to be delivered to the party(ies) listed below:
LAURA B. DUPAIX
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
JAN GRAHAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
160E300S6THFL
PO BOX 140854
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States
mail to the trial court listed below:
SEVENTH DISTRICT, CASTLE DALE
ATTN: APPEALS CLERK
85 E MAIN ST
PO BOX 635
CASTLE DALE UT 84513

Deputy Clerk
Case No. 991006-SC
SEVENTH DISTRICT, CASTLE DALE, 911701048

Addendum H

FIL:D

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT

OCT Z 0 2000

FOR EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
jT

coM ^Mef
[LARRY

L. HUTCHINGS
Petitioner,

vs.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER in re
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT

J

y

j

Case No.: 990700187

STATE OF UTAH
Respondent,

Judge: Bruce K. Halliday

Petitionerfileda an Extraordinary Writ directly with the Supreme Court for the State ofUtah
on November 10,1999. The petition contains extraordinarily long claims and has attached thereto
appendices numbering in excess of 306 pages, (if petitioner's index is to be believed). He has filed
a Request for Appointment of Attorney, and the Court has attempted to review the foregoing. In
addition, the Court reviewed the entry of plea in the underlying matter before Judge Boyd Bunnell,
as well as the admissions of violations alleged in an Order to Show Cause, which brought the
respondent before the Court and resulted in his sentence to incarceration in the Utah State Prison.
From the Court's review, I conclude that the Petition For Extraordinary Writ isfrivolousand time
expended by the county attorney in reviewing the documents, the attorney general in reviewing the
documents whenfiledat the Supreme Court level, as well as this Court has been unnecessary.
The hearing at which the defendant admitted, by and through his attorney Mr. David Allred,
to the violation of the terms of his probation, was held in open Court. The defendant was present.
The defendant's attorney, Mr. David Allred, is a legal defender for Emery County, and was appointed
to represent the petitioner in the Order To Show Cause proceedings. There is no question that the
petitioner had, in fact, violated the terms of his probation, had failed to report, and had not
successfully completed the sexual abuse counseling judgement issued by Judge Bunnell. Based upon
all of the foregoing his probation was revoked and he was sentenced to the Utah State Prison under
the original judgement. The review of the petitioner's pleadings, which the Court has made herein,
seems to indicate that the Order on Order To Show Cause sent the defendant to the Utah State Prison
for incarceration pursuant to the original judgement. The Court has reviewed the original judgement
and the original judgement did not accurately reflect the judge's actions since the pleas taken were
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to two 2nd degree felonies, not a second degree and a lrt degree felony as reflected in the written
judgement. The sentence, however, was accurately reflected in the judgement, to wit, not less than
one (1) year nor more than fifteen (15) years for each count to run concurrently. Based upon the
above, and the Court's assumption that the original judgement was attached to the Order To Show
Cause Judgement, I conclude that there have been no improprieties in the sentencing of the defendant
under the original judgment of the Court and the Order to Show Cause Judgement.
This Court is struck by the volume of pleadings which the petitioner has filed. In reviewing
same, I note that the Court of Appeals in responding to this same petitioner's prayer for relief to that
Court, also found no justification in the petitioner's petition. The petitioner continues to abuse the
legal system relative to requests for relief and has most recently been referred to the Trial Court for
a determination as to whether counsel should be appointed to represent the respondent. The Court
having reviewed, as far as is reasonably possibly, the pleadings concludes that the claims made by the
defendant are frivolous, and have also been dealt with by the Appellate Court as well as the Trial
Court in the disposition which has been made of this matter.
Based thereon, I decline to appoint counsel to represent the defendant andfindthe Petition
frivolous and order thi^sanae dismissed.
Dated this /jr

day of October, 2000.

BY THE COURT:
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM
DECISION AND ORDER IN RE EXTRAORDINARY WRIT by depositing same in the United
States Mail, postage prepaid or hand delivering to the following:
Larry L. Hutchings
#25435, Utah State Prison
PO Box 250
Draper, UT 84020

DATED this

3Cfo

State Of Utah
c/o Brent Langston
Deputy County Attorney
Emery County Courthouse
Castle Dale, UT 84513

day of October, 2000.

Deputy Court Clerk
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H
UNPUBLISHED OPINION.
RULES BEFORE CITING.

CHECK

COURT

Court of Appeals of Utah.
Larry L. HUTCHINGS, Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
STATE of Utah, Respondent and Appellee.
No. 20000994-CA.
March 22, 2001.
Larry L. Hutchings, Draper, pro se.
Before BENCH, BILLINGS, and ORME, JJ.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
PER CURIAM.
*1 Hutchings was convicted in 1992 following
guilty pleas to two second degree felony counts of
Sexual Abuse of a Child. His probation was
revoked in 1996. Based upon Hutchings' failure to
file a docketing statement, this court dismissed a
direct appeal from the probation revocation (Case
No. 960726-CA) on December 9, 1996. Hutchings
then filed his first petition for post- conviction relief
in January of 1997, challenging the probation
revocation on the merits and on procedural grounds.
This court affirmed the district court's dismissal of
that petition. See Hutchings v. State, No.
970479-CA, slip op. (Utah CtApp. Jan. 23, 1998).
Although noting that the trial court's dismissal of
the direct appeal raising essentially the same issues
was appropriate, this court concluded that the
claims in the petition for extraordinary relief also
failed on the merits. In November of 1999,
Hutchings filed a second petition for extraordinary
writ directly in the Utah Supreme Court, stating that
he had been unable to obtain relief from either the
district court or this court. After the supreme court's
transferred the petition to district court, the petition
was dismissed and this appeal followed.
The Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code
Copr. © West 2002 No (

V l t t n - / / r * r i n t \ X / ^ c t 1 o \ i / nt\Yr*IAa>\\iT<zr%t

Ann. §§ 78-35a-101 to -110 (1996), is dispositive.
Section 78-35a-106(1) precludes relief on any
ground that was "raised or addressed ... on appeal"
or "could have been but was not raised on appeal"
or "was raised or addressed in any previous request
for post- conviction relief or could have been, but
was not raised in a previous request for
post-conviction relief."
The claims Hutchings raised in his second petition
were either raised and addressed, or could have
been raised, in either the direct appeal from the
probation revocation, the first petition for
post-conviction relief, or the appeal from dismissal
of that petition. The second petition repeats claims
raised and addressed in prior proceedings including
a claim that his probation terminated in July of
1995, and claims of procedural irregularities in the
revocation proceedings. The remaining claims
could have been raised in the prior proceedings.
Given the preclusive effect of section 78-35a-106,
Hutchings may not continue to obtain review of
claims that were either raised or could have been
raised on direct appeal or in previous
post-conviction proceedings and the appeal
therefrom.
The district court considered and rejected a claim
that the sentence imposed was illegal. See Utah
R.Crim.P. 22(e). The district court concluded that
the judgment incorrectly recited that Hutchings
entered a guilty plea to one first degree felony and
one second degree felony, rather than guilty pleas to
two second degree felonies. The sentence, however,
correctly reflected the conviction for two second
degree felonies, as did subsequent proceedings on
probation revocation. The trial court did not err in
concluding the sentence was not illegal.
Hutchings contends this court cannot act until the
Utah Supreme Court transfers the appeal to this
court. The appeal, however, is within the original
jurisdiction of this court under Utah Code Ann. §
78-2a-3(2Xf)0996), and no transfer from the
supreme court is necessary to vest this court with
jurisdiction.
*2 We affirm the dismissal.
2001 WL 327741 (Utah App.), 2001 UT App 95
END OF DOCUMENT
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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32 P.3d 249 (Table)
(Cite as: 32 P.3d 249)

(The Court's decision is referenced in a "Supreme
Court of Utah Dispositions of Petitions for
Certiorari" table in the Pacific Reporter. See UT R
J ADMIN Rule 4-508 and UT R J ADMIN Rule
4-605.)

Supreme Court of Utah
Hutchings
v.
State
NO. 20010419
August 08, 2001

Lower Court Citation or Number: 20000994

Disposition: Granted.
32 P.3d 249 (Table)
END OF DOCUMENT
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Addendum K

IN THE SUPREME COURT CF THE STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo

Larry L. Hutchings,
Petitioner,
No. 20010419-SC
20C0C994-CA
9907001S7

v.
State of Utah,
Respondent.

ORDER
The court grants Mr, Hutchings' motion to appoint counsel to
represent him on appeal. The court has appointed Mr. D. Matthew
Masccn and requested that he file a brief on behalf of Mr.
Hutchings* The court also, by this order, requests that the
State participate in this appeal and file a brief in response.

FOR THE COURT:

.#1, aoo^
ftichard C. Howe,
Chief Justice

